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Summary 
 
The Norwegian health care system is increasingly dependent on the general practitioner’s 
(GP’s) gatekeeper function for cost containment and for fair and effective resource allocation. 
GPs enjoy extensive professional freedom and there is considerable room for discretionary 
choices. At the same time, during recent decades, the patient’s power and rights have been 
strengthened. This situation calls for a better understanding of GPs’ allocative decision 
making and the patient’s role in it. Hitherto the literature on resource allocation tends to 
overlook the patient’s role in GP decision-making while the literature about GP–patient 
interaction tends to omit questions of resource allocation.  
 
This thesis takes an interdisciplinary approach to GPs’ rationing decisions and the ideals of 
patient involvement. It is based on two separate studies. The first study explores how GPs 
experience the gatekeeper role under the influence of patients and other factors such as 
medical responsibility, economic incentives, competition and the desire to preserve 
professional autonomy. The second study analyses how attitudes towards patient involvement 
influence patient satisfaction and referral rates.  
 
Study 1 (Paper I and II) is based on focus group interviews with a strategic sample of 81 GPs 
from the municipalities of Bergen and Oslo combined with a short questionnaire survey 
among the same participants. The interviews took place in 2002. Interviews were coded by 
hand and analysed qualitatively through framework analysis. The survey data were analysed 
descriptively. Study 2 is a questionnaire study among GPs and their patients carried out 
during 2004 in Bergen. The data are based on questionnaires handed out by 56 GPs and the 
responses from 1268 of their patients. Descriptive statistics, linear and logistic regressions 
were the main forms of analysis. The key finding of the first study was that Norwegian GPs’ 
commitment to the gatekeeper role seems to be declining, and that they generally make 
rationing decisions only when they are able to come to an agreement with patients and avoid 
conflict. The findings also suggest that many Norwegian GPs do not fully understand the need 
for rationing while others regard rationing as conflicting with other concerns. 
 
In study 2 (Paper III and IV) the results indicate that Norwegian patients have a strong 
preference for patient involvement while GPs are relatively less positive to involving patients 
in medical decision-making. GPs with positive attitudes to patient involvement referred less 
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and were more likely to have satisfied patients. Agreement of attitudes towards patient 
involvement between patients and GP had a strong and significant negative effect on referral 
rate but no significant effect on patient satisfaction.  
 
The suggested interpretation of the results is that the participating GPs have turned their 
attention towards patients’ preferences and away from unpleasant rationing decisions. GPs 
and patients’ attitudes towards patient involvement affect resource allocation, but this 
association is poorly understood. Hence there is a need for further interdisciplinary studies to 
explore how GP–patient interaction affects resource allocation. Open debate about the role 
and limitations of patient involvement and how increased patient power affects resource 
allocation should be encouraged.  
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Summary in Norwegian 
 
Fastlegenes portvaktrolle: Prioritering og brukermedvirkning i primærhelsetjenesten. 
 
Det norske helsevesenet er avhengig av fastlegenes portvaktrolle for å sikre kostnadskontroll 
samt en rettferdig og effektiv fordeling av ressursene. Primærlegene har tradisjonelt hatt en 
høy grad av profesjonell frihet og stort rom for skjønnsmessige avgjørelser, samtidig som 
pasientenes innflytelse og rettigheter gradvis er blitt styrket i løpet av de siste 30 årene. På 
bakgrunn av dette er det ønskelig med en bedre forståelse av hvordan fastlegene tar 
beslutninger som får betydning for ressursfordelingen og hvilken rolle pasienten spiller i 
beslutningsprosessen. Hittil har studier av ressursallokering stort sett utelatt pasientens rolle 
for legenes beslutninger samtidig som studier av lege-pasientforhold i liten grad har befattet 
seg med ressursbruk.  
 
Denne studien har en tverrfaglig tilnærming til primærlegers prioriteringsbeslutninger og 
idealer om brukermedvirkning. Studien består av to deler. Første del er basert på 
gruppeintervjuer og utforsker hvilke hensyn legene tar i vanskelige avgjørelser som 
portvakter. Andre del av studien er basert på en spørreundersøkelse blant fastleger og deres 
pasienter der vi undersøker hvordan legen og pasientens holdninger til brukermedvirkning 
påvirker pasienttilfredshet og henvisningsrate.  
 
Den første delstudien er basert på fokusgruppeintervjuer med 81 fastleger fra Bergen og Oslo 
kombinert med et kort spørreskjema blant gruppedeltakerne. Intervjuene ble gjennomført i 
2002. Den andre delstudien ble gjennomført i 2004 og er en spørreundersøkelse blant 56 
fastleger i Bergen og 1268 av deres pasienter.  
 
Hovedresultatet i den første delstudien var at mange primærleger i vår studie opplever at de i 
mindre grad fungerer som portvakter og i liten grad identifiserer seg med den rollen. Det ser 
ut til at fastlegene hovedsaklig sier nei til lavt prioriterte tjenester når de oppnår enighet med 
pasienten og dermed unngår konflikt. Fastlegene ser ut til å ha liten forståelse for behovet for 
å prioritere helsetjenester i en situasjon med god ressurstilgang. En del rapporterer også at de i 
liten grad følger nasjonale retningslinjer. I tillegg kommer portvaktrollen og ansvaret for å 
forvalte fellesskapets ressurser ofte i konflikt med hensynet til den enkelte pasient og dennes 
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rett til å delta i medisinske beslutninger. Også økonomiske insentiver i fastlegeordningen, økt 
medisinsk ansvar og tydeligere konkurranse om pasienter oppleves som faktorer som gjør det 
vanskeligere for fastlegene å prioritere helsetjenester. 
 
Resultatene i den andre delstudien indikerer at norske pasienter har en sterk preferanse for 
brukermedvirkning, mens fastlegene foretrekker en litt svakere grad av brukermedvirkning. 
Fastleger som er positive til brukermedvirkning hadde mer tilfredse pasienter og henviste 
mindre enn de som var mer negative til brukermedvirkning. Samsvar i holdninger til 
brukermedvirkning mellom lege og pasient påvirket ikke pasienttilfredshet, men hadde 
derimot en negativ effekt på antall henvisninger.  
 
Konklusjonen av studien er at mange fastleger i vårt materiale retter oppmerksomheten mot 
pasientenes ønsker og behov og bort fra det de opplever som ubehagelige 
prioriteringsoppgaver. Fastleger og pasienters holdninger til brukermedvirkning påvirker 
ressursbruken i helsevesenet, men vi vet foreløpig lite om disse sammenhengene. Følgelig er 
det behov for videre tverrfaglige studier som kan utforske hvordan lege-pasientinteraksjon 
påvirker ressursbruk og -fordeling i helsesektoren. 
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Background  
Norway is one of the countries that spend most resources on health care in the world. In 
recent years, several costly reforms have been introduced in the health sector. In 2004 we 
spent 36 000 Norwegian kroner, or approximately 4500 US$ per capita on health care, and 
there has been a yearly increase in health expenditure of 4%. Only the US and Switzerland 
use more resources per capita on health in absolute terms (1). This means that Norway uses 
close to 10% of the gross national product on health care, and this is mainly public spending 
through universal insurance. Through recent reforms in the health sector, quality and 
availability of services have been strengthened, while costs continue to rise (2). Hence there is 
growing public concern about cost containment in addition to the focus on quality and 
distribution of services. In his recent book on the history of Norwegian health policy during 
the last 100 years, Ole Berg claims that since the 1970’s there has been a shift in Norwegian 
health policy from a focus on distributive justice to a growing concern with efficiency and 
cost containment (3). The latter policy is reflected in media publicity and stated in terms of 
basic values and aims by the health authorities (4-6).  
 
The idea of the welfare state is important in Norway and there is a deeply rooted belief that 
the public health system should promote equity in health through equal access to health care, 
as well as a corresponding scepticism towards the use of private payment for health care (7). 
With the aim of securing fair and efficient distribution of health services and to contain costs, 
the general practitioner has traditionally held the role of gatekeeper and acted as a filter to the 
use of public specialist care and reimbursement of costs of medication. In a third party payer-
system with practically free access to high-tech health services, the GPs gatekeeper role is 
crucial. Simultaneously, GPs are fairly independent from health authorities with few 
restrictions on and little monitoring of their decision-making and services (8), both as 
compared to other doctors and as compared to GPs in other countries, e.g. the UK or the USA. 
A substantial proportion of expenditure on health care is used in primary care (16%) 
(compared to 54% in the hospital sector) and 4200 doctors work as GPs (compared to 9100 in 
specialist care) (2, 9). More importantly, decisions made in general practice heavily influence 
resources used on hospital stays, medical drugs and laboratory tests. International studies 
indicate that GPs influence as much as 80% of health care expenditures (10). In addition, GPs 
influence expenditure on sickness benefit and disability pensions.  
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Universal coverage applies to both general and specialist health services but the public do not 
have direct access to reimbursed specialist health care, which is filtered through the GPs. 
Accordingly, the Norwegian primary care sector is seen as the foundation of the health care 
system where the GPs hold the central role as co-ordinators of health services (11). They are 
therefore supposed to follow the principle that patients should be treated at the lowest 
appropriate level of the health care system (the LEON-principle) (12).  
 
Respect for patient involvement and the patient’s subjective view has been emphasized in 
official documents in recent years (7, 12). Several legal steps have been taken to strengthen 
patient rights, among them a recent reform in primary care: In 2001, a new, list based system 
was introduced (4, 7, 13, 14). The new scheme grants every inhabitant the right to choose 
whether to be under the responsibility of a regular GP and which GP that should be, as well as 
the right to change GP at will. By 2005, 99.5% of the population have chosen to be part of 
this system (15). The public’s preferences for GPs form the basis of the GPs’ personal lists of 
patients, and the GP is expected to give priority to their list patients. The GPs may have up to 
2500 patients on the list but are also free to set a maximum limit below this. Every month, 
GPs get an update of their list from the National Insurance Service with an overview of 
newcomers and drop-outs. The GPs’ income consists of three components: About 30% 
consists of capitation-based reimbursement paid by the municipality with whom the GP is 
contracted. This part of the income is directly dependent on the number of people on the list. 
The rest of the payment comes from a small out-of- pocket fee paid by the patients combined 
with activity-based reimbursements paid by the National Insurance Service. In summary, the 
reform made the GPs financially dependent on patients’ willingness to be on their lists. 
Simultaneously, the patient list system emphasises the GP’s position as gatekeeper, both 
through an increase in referral requirements for secondary care and through giving the GP the 
co-ordinating role of all healthcare their regular patients receive.  
 
The aims of the list reform, according to the White Paper, were to make the system more 
responsible to patients, to strengthen the performance of the health care sector with respect to 
fair distribution of high quality services, as well as to secure a more rational allocation of 
resources (4). The focus on patients’ rights in the reform reflects the culmination of the 
steadily evolving shift in power in the doctor-patient dyad which has been observed in many 
western countries (16-18) and the health care systems’ responsiveness to consumer demands 
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has been an important subject of reforms in various countries (19-23). A question that is 
emerging from this development is how the shift of power from the GP towards the patient 
influences the GP’s professional autonomy and thereby her motivation and accomplishment 
of the gatekeeper task. So far, there has been little empirical investigation of this area (17).   
  
To sum up, in Norway, as in many other countries, we are in a situation of high and rising 
costs of health services and the sector relies heavily on GPs for rationing health care. This 
implies that GPs sometimes need to ration health care, i.e. withhold potentially beneficial 
services (24) that the patient demands (25, 26). At the same time, there is an explicit policy of 
enhancing consumer influence. This situation, which is seen in several countries with 
gatekeeper systems, has led to a growing literature on GPs’ allocative decision-making in 
health economics and health services research (27). Still there is a lack of research into 
patients’ influence on GPs’ rationing decisions (27-29). In medical anthropology and 
sociology, on the other hand, there is an extensive literature on the doctor-patient relationship, 
which tends to focus on power relations and patient’s preferences, but these studies seldom 
consider questions of resource use and distribution (26, 30-35). During the last decade, a 
normative literature within medical ethics has drawn on both of these traditions and has 
directed attention to questions of how rationing decisions can be made acceptable to the 
public, using an ideal of respect for patient autonomy and public accountability (36-42). This 
important literature touches upon dilemmas of the gatekeeper role related to the doctor-patient 
relationship, but this literature is mainly theoretical. There is a lack of empirical investigation 
of how GPs manage to combine ideals and practice of rationing and shared decision-making. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore empirically how GPs’ experience the dilemmas of the 
gatekeeper role, on the one hand, and how attitudes to patient involvement relate to cost and 
quality of services, on the other. The approach is interdisciplinary as it draws upon theory and 
findings from medical ethics, general practice research, social anthropology and health 
economics, and uses both qualitative and quantitative methodology.  
 
The thesis consists of two studies. The first study (Paper I and II) is based on focus group 
discussions with Norwegian GPs and it explores central and changing factors influencing the 
GPs rationing decisions. In the focus interviews, the patient’s increasingly influential role 
emerged as a concern among the GPs. Partly because of this finding from the first study, the 
second study (paper III and IV), which is a questionnaire survey, incorporates both GPs’ and 
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patients’ views. This is an attempt to quantify GP attitudes towards patient involvement in 
clinical decision-making that emerged in the first study and compare them to patient attitudes. 
In addition, it is an attempt to test the influence of these attitudes on patient satisfaction and 
referral rates (as indicators for quality and resource allocation). 
 
As this work is carried out in the interface between several fields and disciplines, and the 
background is quite complex, an overview of the introductory section is given here: I start 
with the Theoretical framework for the study of medical decision-making, where I present the 
basic division in the behavioural sciences between theories and models of rational actors on 
the one hand and theories of limited rationality which emphasize the importance of norms, 
altruism and limited information on decision-making on the other. The two competing 
approaches are also based on and produce different empirical knowledge about factors 
influencing GP decision-making. I finish the section by presenting the theoretical approach of 
my study based on Barth’s model of “process analysis”. In the next section, Shared decision-
making, I introduce my use of the concepts of “patient involvement” and “shared decision-
making”. Then I outline some of the relevant social research about shared decision-making. In 
the section, Rationing, I clarify my use of the concepts “rationing”, “gatekeeper” and 
“autonomy”. Subsequently, I give a brief overview of the current literature on the dilemmas 
inherent in the gatekeeper role and some of the suggested solutions to these dilemmas. In 
particular, I mention the new theoretical focus on the conflict between rationing and shared 
decision-making. This literature integrates studies in health economics of GPs’ allocative 
decision-making with studies in health services research of patient involvement, and forms the 
basis of the empirical study of this thesis. 
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Theoretical framework for the study of medical decision-
making 
Reasons behind choice  
Theories about how people make choices and why they act as they do form the basis of all 
social sciences. However, there are a number of analytical approaches to the study of social 
acts and structures, which are a source of never-ending debate and where opinions are divided 
between and within disciplines. Man can be seen as a rational actor maximising individual 
utility, as a passive pawn in the social game responding to external rules and norms of 
conduct, but also as a social being aiming at the social good of important others and capable 
of acting altruistically. It has been argued that what distinguishes the social sciences from the 
natural sciences is the interest in man as an intentional being. Human acts are loaded with 
meaning as opposed to animal behaviour. Weber distinguishes between acts that are rational 
and goal-oriented, rational and value-oriented, acts motivated by affections and finally acts 
driven by tradition (43). 
 
Within theories about rational decision-making, it is common to distinguish between the 
classical theories of pure rational choice and modern theories of limited rationality, which 
incorporate constraints on rational choice, such as imperfect information, influence of other 
actors, unclear preferences or the tendency to form habits or decision rules (44). A more 
severe constraint on rational choice is that many actions are taken not so much because of 
their intended consequences as because of their appropriateness (44). This approach is taken 
in theories of identities and cultural norms of behaviour, represented by norm sociologists 
such as Durkheim (45) and Bourdieu (46). When it comes to the study of doctors’ behaviour, 
such theories add important aspects of professional identity and norms of conduct. 
Theoretically then, there is a division between models of medical decision-making focusing 
on norms and appropriateness, in this case represented by medical practice and professional 
identity, and models of rational choice assuming that the GP deliberately assesses alternatives 
with a view to the expected consequences (44).  
 
It is not obvious which approach is most suitable in understanding how GPs generally make 
clinical decisions. In a study of GPs, who are highly specialised actors constantly making 
discretionary choices within severely limited time, working alone, but in a professional 
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setting, both approaches seem relevant. Medical education and medical guidelines equip the 
GP with rules to follow when making decisions. Combined with experience earned through 
practising professional discretion, it is easy to imagine that the GP could reach a level where 
decisions are taken more or less automatically without much deliberation. For the experienced 
GP, this is perhaps true for many decisions.  
 
When it comes to understanding the special case of rationing decisions, several valid 
arguments can be forwarded both for applying the models of rational and goal oriented choice 
and for the theories of affective or normative motivators:  
 
Firstly, the GP’s decisions have direct consequences for another actor with major interests in 
the choices made, namely the patient, who is normally present when the decisions are taken 
and who must be expected to be involved and attempting to influence the decision taken. This, 
in turn, forces the GP to argue her own view and thereby to consider the rationale behind the 
decisions. On the other hand, depending on the balance of power between GP and patient, the 
patient may not be involved in the decision-making process and may not question the clinical 
decision at all. This would give the GP the opportunity to make rationing implicit and thereby 
act according to routine or guidelines. 
 
Secondly, making rationing decisions implies that the GP refuses to fulfil the patient’s desire 
for services. So, allocative decisions of this kind contain an inherent conflict between GP and 
patient. In a situation of negotiation or conflict, arguments for and intentions behind decisions 
are sharpened. Still, face to face rationing involves relating to the emotions and reactions of 
the consulting patients, which may make the affective and immediate side of the decision-
making process more influential, more so the more crucial the decisions are to the patient. In 
addition, internalised professional norms of doing the utmost for the benefit of the present 
patient could possibly dominate the decision. 
 
Thirdly, many Western health care systems are, like the Norwegian one, rather affluent.  
Rationing decisions are therefore, for the most part, enacted in a grey zone concerning 
interventions where benefits are marginal or contested. In addition, governmental guidelines 
are often lacking or indeterminate. In these cases, it is not possible merely to rely on medical 
knowledge when making decisions. It is likely that GPs are influenced by concerns other than 
purely medical when making treatment choices.  
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Influences on doctors’ decision-making 
Let us consider the knowledge yielded by the different approaches. This section reports on 
economic studies of resource allocation, of rational choice and the maximising of utilities 
versus medical studies of uncertainty in medical decision-making. 
 
Health economic studies of GP behaviour have mainly focused on how economic incentives 
and preferences for income versus leisure influence decision-making (27, 47, 48) . These 
studies predominantly use data at the macro-level to explain GP behaviour. The majority of 
the empirical studies of income motivated behaviour conclude that GP behaviour is affected 
by private economic incentives at least when medical decisions are within the grey zone of 
uncertainty (49-58). The economic studies of GP behaviour have as their starting point the 
asymmetry of information between GP and patient, and a contentious subject within this 
literature is the question of supplier-induced demand (SID). The concept of supplier induced 
demand or, as in this case, physician–induced demand (PID) was introduced by Evans in 1974 
(47), and there is still consensus in the field about his definition of PID: “Physician-induced 
demand exists when the physician influences a patient’s demand for care against the 
physician’s interpretation of the best interest of the patient” (25). The hypothesis is that the 
motivation behind this behaviour is self-interest, usually interpreted as financial motives. PID 
may obviously have negative consequences for the efficiency of the health care services and 
cost containment.  
 
The economic approach to GP decision-making has had a mixed reception among other health 
services researchers who claim that health economic studies tend to overstate the GPs’ private 
economic interests while professional and altruistic motives (like the satisfaction of curing 
sick people or the esteem of colleagues), are under-communicated (59-61). Evidence of 
persistence of practice style over time, in spite of changing economic and organisational 
influences, is seen as an indication that the individual approach to professional uncertainty is a 
more important explanatory factor for variation between doctors than non-medical incentives 
(62-64). 
 
This criticism of health economic studies is understandable; Economic studies have a 
tendency to focus on incentives that can be altered by health management, while economic 
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incentives are generally not regarded as a legitimate influencing factor among medical 
practitioners (65). Economists, on their side, accuse medical studies of an unbalanced focus 
on uncertainty leading to different medical judgements as the dominant explanatory factor 
(66, 67).   
 
There have also been objections to the economic approach at the theoretical level. Economic 
models have recurrently been criticised for being reductionistic and deterministic; that the 
models are simplistic and too focused on economic incentives (46, 68). There is often little 
appreciation of the rigidity of economic models among other health services researchers, as 
these models seem to ignore the issue that medical decision-making in practice is often 
ambiguous and paradoxical. 
 
Economists argue that economic models have to be simple as their purpose is to calculate the 
probabilities of how much different motives influence behaviour. Still, some of the criticism 
is indeed being met in modern economic literature, which argues for including a range of 
different motives besides income and preference for leisure in the utility function modelling 
GP decision-making, such as, ethical considerations, autonomy, status, medically interesting 
cases, altruistic concern for patients and interests of the society (10, 47, 48, 69-75). There 
have also been a few innovative attempts to include both supply and demand elements, and 
one model attempts to include the distribution of power between doctor and patient (76). 
However, there has been little success in turning these complex models into empirical 
research (27).  
 
Consequently, the empirical studies generally focus on one or a few factors of influence. 
There is no consensus on the relative importance of the different motives and little 
understanding of the interaction between them. Summarising the empirical research, GPs 
seem to be influenced by professional norms and colleagues (77, 78), personal economic 
motives (51, 79, 80), the pharmaceutical industry (81-84), patients’ preferences and pressure 
(85-94) and by knowledge about treatment costs (95).  
 
The factors that to varying degrees seem to influence doctors’ decisions can be grouped into 
three main categories; concerns for the patient, concerns for society, and self interest (10). Not 
surprisingly, several studies find that professional concerns related to the patient’s medical 
needs are the most important factor influencing medical decisions (10, 59, 94, 96-101). 
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However, few studies distinguish between the GP’s perception of biomedical need and the 
patient’s influence by asserting her subjective desires for medical care (94). Hence, 
knowledge about the effect of patient involvement on medical decision-making is scarce. One 
exception is a small UK study which investigated a range of influencing factors on GP 
prescribing decisions (102). This study found that non-clinical factors such as pressure from 
patients combined with the concern about preserving the doctor-patient relationship 
sometimes led the GP to ignore worries about clinical appropriateness, side effects and costs. 
Several other studies of perceived pressure from patients conclude that GPs’ decisions are 
influenced by a concern for preserving a good doctor-patient relationship (90, 93). However, 
we have found no study that empirically analyses how the GP’s and the patient’s attitudes to 
patient involvement affect rationing decisions.  
 
Another limitation of the literature is that the studies tend to look at decisions on a general 
level. Not many have specifically studied decision-making within the grey zone. There are 
indications that when medical knowledge is uncertain or effects are known to be marginal, 
non-medical factors are of greater importance (10, 103). 
 
There is a large and well documented variation in GPs’ practice style which has significant 
consequences for resource allocation (10, 57, 59, 63, 92, 104-107). Referral rates have been 
investigated in many of these studies. Variation in referral rates is commonly found to be 
between twofold and fourfold, and sometimes even 20-fold, and the reasons behind this are 
poorly understood (27, 85, 92, 107-110). To explain the variation, health economic studies 
focus on the asymmetry of information and agency problems between doctor and patients 
(and between doctor and health authorities) (25, 111-113), while studies within medical health 
care research tend to focus on the uncertainty in clinical decision-making and see the variation 
in practice style as a consequence of this (59, 114, 115). Studies of small area variation find 
that variation in utilisation rates do not affect health outcome between areas, which suggests 
that a substantial proportion of health care belongs in the grey zone or within flat of the curve 
medicine where benefits are uncertain (57, 116-118). Only about half of this variation can be 
explained by summarising the influence of the different factors (92). Health authorities are 
concerned about the unexplained variations as they are taken to suggest inefficiency, but 
research into this field is lacking and evidence is inconclusive (109). Thus qualitative and 
processual studies incorporating the interaction between factors, such as for example the 
doctor-patient relationship, have been called for (92, 107). 
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The process-analytical approach 
In an attempt to merge the perspective of GPs as rational actors making deliberative choices 
to maximise utilities with the perspective of altruism and the importance of professional 
norms, I have taken the holistic approach as interpreted by Fredrik Barth, as my starting point 
in this work. Fredrik Barth (119, 120) outlined the anthropological approach to Neumann and 
Morgenstern’s Theory of Games (121), and Barth’s approach has since become an established 
model for analysing individual choices and social patterns of behaviour. In this approach, 
societies are modelled as interactional systems where actors make rational choices, 
constrained and formed in interaction with other actors’ choices in a framework of cultural 
values as well as of legislation, economic, geographical and ecological constraints. For the 
study of GP behaviour, this would mean that the GP makes decisions based on, for example, 
her interpretation of the medical problem, her internalised professional values, the patient’s 
preferences and the expected reactions of the patient (and other actors) on the different actions 
the GP could possibly take.  
 
We know that in a substantial proportion of the decisions GPs make, there is no unambiguous 
medical indication of what would be the right decision and this fundamental uncertainty of 
medical decision-making is reflected in the variation in practice. In these grey zones GP may 
have several different motives which she will consider consciously or which will influence 
her subconsciously as she makes the decision (about treatment, issuing certificates, referring, 
tests etc).  The anthropological approach is based on a process of discovery and observation to 
extract the informant’s own subjective list of significant concerns. Hence we did start out (in 
Study 1) with ideas and expectations of factors which influence GPs’ decision-making. 
However, during interviews, we were also striving to be open to other motives. This approach 
contrasts with models and methods in economics, where incentives and motives are normally 
presupposed.  
 
Although the individual actor is the object of studies of rational choice, the social sciences 
often aim at explaining the aggregated pattern or the macro-level, and economic models are 
quite suitable for this. However, the problem of how to combine the micro- with the macro-
level in academic work is much debated. According to Barth, the aggregated patterns can 
neither be thoroughly understood by looking at the formal rules governing society nor by 
merely observing patterns of behaviour. Therefore the researcher should try to understand the 
actor’s subjective point of view, looking for common values among members of the social 
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system being studied (120). This focus on the everyday meetings between individuals but 
with the aim of understanding patterns of society, is perhaps the most essential contribution of 
anthropology to the behavioural sciences. In Barth’s words: “I would say that it is one of the 
strengths in anthropological analysis that we are more consistently concerned and able to 
interrelate the individual and the aggregate level than most of the behavioural sciences, 
though this is probably achieved at the cost of some elegance in our analyses of both” (120). 
 
In this study, I aim to gain insight into the interplay between the micro and macro level in 
GPs’ rationing decisions by starting out with the individual informant’s views while 
simultaneously recognising the GP’s role in a wide framework of interactions with other 
actors as well as with more stable organisational structures. Multidisciplinary empirical 
studies of GP decision-making have isolated several influential factors. In the context of 
rationing decisions in contemporary general practice, one of the most important factors of 
influence seems to be the patient. Patient involvement in medical decision-making is also a 
political aim of the Norwegian health services. Still our understanding of how patient 
involvement influences rationing decisions is meagre. 
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Shared decision-making 
 
Concepts 
There are several ways of conceptualising and ordering the roles of doctor and patient in the 
consultation according to the degree of patient involvement in decision-making. Moreover, 
there is considerable disagreement among theorists and researchers about how the different 
models should be understood (122). Generally, patient involvement is modelled on a 
continuum from the paternalistic doctor versus passive patient, where the patient is not 
informed and does not take part in the decisions, to informed decision-making where the 
patient makes autonomous decisions based on evidence-based information obtained from the 
GP or elsewhere. The paternalistic model is not much used in current research in general 
practice as some degree of patient involvement is expected. Likewise, the consumerist model 
of the patient as sole decision maker does not seem realistic based on empirical evidence 
(123) and given the fact that the doctor-patient relationship as a rule is one of asymmetric 
information where the doctor is expected to be the professional expert and has to take the 
formal responsibility for the medical decisions taken in the consultation. The model of shared 
decision-making is commonly placed somewhere in between these extremes. This is the most 
broadly used model of patient involvement in research today, even though a commonly 
agreed definition of how and how much patients should be involved in shared decision-
making is still lacking in the literature (122-129). Interestingly, there seems to be a high level 
of congruence in practitioners’ perception of what shared decision-making entails: According 
to doctors participating in a Canadian study, shared decision-making requires patient and 
doctor to share the whole process of decision-making, i.e. share information, discuss options 
and come to an agreement about interventions (130).   
 
In this work, I use the term patient involvement to indicate some degree of patient 
involvement between the extremes of the passive patient and the consumerist patient who 
dominates decisions. The term shared decision-making is used in a more narrow sense and 
refers to the model of patient involvement, described in the Canadian study.  
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Studies of patient involvement in medical decision-making 
The literature about attitudes towards doctor- and patient roles in medical decision-making 
has largely been normative and coloured by the changing ideals in society in general and 
within general practice in particular. This applies both to studies by medical professionals 
with the purpose of saying something about how the GP’s role may best be performed, and it 
applies to studies by social scientists who have been concerned with patients’ rights and 
experiences.  
 
During the last 30-40 years, there has been an ongoing process of shifting power from doctor 
to patient in general practice, and patient involvement in decision-making is now an ideal 
promoted in a growing number of countries (16, 17, 29, 126, 131). Some of the many 
explanatory factors that have been suggested for this change have been; general social 
development has made the public more educated and information more accessible, a greater 
proportion of patients suffer from chronic diseases and such patients tend to be more 
experienced and competent. There has also been a growth of patient organisations promoting 
patients’ rights and new movements within medical ethics arguing for shared decision-
making, transparency and accountability in medical decision-making. During this period, 
patients have become more equal in power and status to the GP and more patients are able to 
share decisions with their GP. In some settings, the GP may even be regarded as merely an 
expert who offers a service according to the consumer’s demand (125).  
 
Some authors do however argue that the effect of the power shift is exaggerated in the 
literature and is not always supported by patients’ reports (132-134).  Several empirical 
studies have attempted to reveal the extent to which decisions are actually shared in modern 
general practice and to map the preferences of doctors and patients. But findings are not 
consistent (123, 129). There seems to be a majority of patients and doctors who claim to 
prefer a high degree of patient involvement in clinical decision making (129, 135-137), but 
these attitudes are not matched by behaviour. In particular doctors seem to deviate from their 
alleged ideal in practice situations (29, 129, 135, 138).  
 
It has been argued that the variety of theoretical models and measurement instruments has 
impeded empirical research on the doctor-patient relationship as well as contributing to the 
lack of agreement on what patients’ and doctors’ attitudes are today (122, 123, 130, 139, 140). 
The measurement scale, which is used in Study 2, is of the more moderate type that puts 
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shared decision-making as the top score and highest level of patient autonomy. Studies using 
this type of scale, find that between 22 and 81% of patients prefer shared decision-making 
(135), while, for example, Kraetschmer et al, using a scale with informed decision-making at 
the top level, find that fewer then three percent of patients prefer to be the main decision-
maker (128).  
 
The current state of research in this area seems to be that whether and how much patients are 
involved in medical decision making depends on the context; i.e. characteristics of the patient, 
the doctor and the nature of the health problem (129, 134, 138). Haug and Lavin conclude: 
“- the answer to the question – practitioner or patient, who is in charge? – is, it depends on 
who the doctor is, who the patient is and why they have met” (129). In general younger, 
female and well-educated patients prefer to be involved. Preferences also vary markedly 
according to cultural background (141).  
 
We know much less about the characteristics of GPs who are liable to let the patients have a 
say, although female GPs seem to be more in favour of sharing decisions than male GPs (142, 
143). While current studies find that most GPs prefer patient involvement, there is, at the 
same time, a growing number of GPs who voice discontent and concern with what they 
experience as a loss of professional autonomy, both in relation to health authorities and in 
relation to patients (17, 144-146). According to an Australian study of how GPs’ professional 
identity is affected by health care reform, professional autonomy is continuously renegotiated 
in the consultations of contemporary general practice. Professional autonomy is reported to be 
declining as GPs are scrutinised both by health authorities imposing more monitoring to 
secure rationing and patients demanding to be more involved in decision-making (17). As 
noted earlier, there is also some evidence that GPs experience social pressure from patients as 
a factor of influence on medical decision-making, which sometimes even overrules the GP’s 
clinical judgement (102). 
 
A concern has been raised about the danger of undermining professional norms, such as 
altruism, which are at the heart of the medical profession and form a prime condition for the 
trust that both the public and the authorities traditionally have placed in the profession (146-
148). Furthermore, this trust has been the basis of the professional authority and freedom that 
GPs have traditionally enjoyed (147). The deprofessionalisation thesis suggests that, on one 
side, there is a danger that consumerism and competition will undermine professional norms 
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and, on the other, rules and regulations posed by authorities are a threat to professional 
freedom (18, 149).  
 
In summary, the patient holds a unique position in the GP’s clinical decision-making. How 
influential the patient is, varies with the characteristics and attitudes of patient and GP and the 
context of the consultation (e.g. the patient’s state of health). The final decisions can be seen 
as a compromise resulting from negotiations between GP and patient, depending on the 
distribution of power between them.  
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Rationing 
Concepts 
The word rationing is used in slightly different ways in the literature. It is often used 
synonymously with priority setting (150) as a recognition of the fact that resources are being 
deliberately allocated between different needs, patient groups or individuals according to 
principles for priory setting and evaluation of needs. Some authors go further and use the term 
interchangeably with resource allocation. They argue that priority setting and rationing are 
constantly taking place in general practice simply because resources are experienced as 
scarce, and through discretionary choices the GP is, and always has been, rationing health 
care through medical decision making whether the priorities she makes are deliberate or not 
(41). Other authors reserve the use of the term rationing to cases where priority setting leads 
to denial of potentially beneficial health care (26).    
 
Although I recognise that gatekeeping and rationing are also about letting people through and 
allocating resources to where they can best be used in a fair manner, the focus of this thesis is 
the problematic situation of implementing priority setting at the micro-level, when rationing 
means saying no in a face to face encounter. Thus I find the narrow definition of rationing 
most useful here. Rationing then, is when the GP intentionally, according to some principle 
for priority setting, denies patients potentially beneficial care. The disputed part of this 
definition is the concept of benefit that entails both a biomedical need and the patient’s desire 
and preferences (26, 151). I will return to this question in the discussion of the results. 
 
Closely tied to the discussion of rationing is the term gatekeeper. In the international 
literature, gatekeeping usually refers to the filtering of referrals to specialist care through the 
GPs (152). However, in the Nordic model GPs also have important allocative functions 
regarding other welfare benefits, such as sickness benefits. Thus, I use the word gatekeeper as 
a synonym for rationing agent. Additionally, and according to the narrower definition of 
rationing, the focus here is when gatekeeping means closing the door.  
 
Another essential concept in this thesis is autonomy. In paper II we discuss both the 
professional autonomy of the GPs and the autonomy of the patients. Generally, autonomy 
refers to the human capacity for making independent choice (153, 154). One could argue that 
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absolute autonomy does not exist, as this requires the actor to be fully informed and free from 
external influence, which of course is unrealistic. I will therefore add Beauchamp and 
Childress’ specification of the general concept of autonomy: According to their view, 
autonomous action is intentional, which is an absolute requirement (151). Additionally, 
autonomy requires a degree of understanding and freedom from controlling influences. Hence 
in empirical studies one usually speaks of a continuum of autonomy. In medical ethics, 
patient autonomy can be specified as the patient’s right to be informed and to be involved in 
the decision-making process regarding her own medical condition. 
 
Studies of the dilemma of rationing 
Within modern medical ethics, there is consensus that respect for patient autonomy is a 
professional obligation, and that the patient should be offered the option of choosing, even if 
this means that some patients opt not to be informed and delegate decision making to the 
doctor or others (151). However, the GP is also a gatekeeper responsible for the welfare of her 
other patients and for distributing resources fairly. If rationing is defined as denying potential 
beneficial care, and we include both the GP and the patient’s view of benefit, it implies some 
limitation on patient autonomy as well as professional autonomy (155). There is therefore a 
potential scenario of conflicting concerns in the gatekeeper role.  
 
Since the mid-nineties a small body of literature among some North American medical 
ethicists has succeeded in drawing attention to questions regarding how to combine the 
considerations for the individual consulting patient with those for the broader population and 
how to make rationing decisions reasonable in the eyes of the public (36, 37, 40-42). At the 
institutional level, Gibson et al have conducted a couple of pioneering case studies within 
Canadian hospitals illuminating different influences on the rationing process and how power 
relations between decision makers at different levels of the organisation impede a reasonable 
rationing process (156, 157). Yet, these studies do not focus directly on power relations in the 
doctor-patient interaction. As a group of British health services researchers has pointed out, 
there seems to be a dilemma between the need for rationing and the ideal of shared decision-
making in consultations (131, 158). If there is a potential conflict of interests between doctor 
autonomy and patient autonomy regarding rationing, it is relevant to focus on power relations 
and interactions and how autonomy is negotiated, as Davis so elegantly puts it in the title of 
an article about autonomy in the doctor-patient relationship: “Just whose autonomy is it?” 
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(153). Still the concern for professional autonomy has received considerably less attention in 
the literature than considerations for patient autonomy and the former has seldom been 
included in the literature on shared decision-making.  
 
Related to this, though not specifically concerned with patient autonomy and shared decision 
making, a few empirical studies point to dilemmas of the gatekeeper role. Both in Norway and 
other countries with a gatekeeper system, researchers have noted a recurring dilemma in 
general practice, namely the gatekeeper versus advocate dilemma between cost and care in the 
health services (28, 159-164). This research highlights the difficult combination of roles the 
GP holds as she is responsible for serving the interests of the individual patient and is 
simultaneously supposed to serve as a rationing agent on behalf of the common resources of 
society. In a Norwegian study from 1995, 68% of the GPs reported that they had sometimes 
or often refrained from giving the best treatment to patients because it was too expensive 
(163). In contrast, a later study found that more than half of the GPs in Norway consider 
patients’ wishes to be more important for medical decisions than their own professional 
judgement (165). Moreover, almost half of the doctors admitted to have glossed over the facts 
when writing medical certificates in order to support the patient’s case. Together, these two 
studies indicate that the GPs’ willingness to hold the gatekeeper role is declining. Similar 
changes in attitude were also reported in another recent study of Norwegian GPs (166). 
Additionally, a new Norwegian study shows that guidelines for rationing seldom are adhered 
to (167). At the same time referral rates have increased after the list reform. These studies 
confirm the impression from British as well as North American studies, that GPs are 
increasingly uncomfortable with the gatekeeper role (28, 29, 168, 169).  
 
We have found one recently published qualitative study from the UK which explicitly 
discusses the conflict between rationing and patient involvement in decision-making (29).  
Jones et al note a discrepancy between ethical principles and practice regarding ideals for 
patient involvement and equitable resource use. The study also points to a lack of consensus 
on how patients should be involved in rationing decisions. 
 
A number of solutions to the rationing dilemma have been put forward in the theoretical 
literature: Some authors argue for explicit rationing (38, 159, 170), others for accountability 
for reasonableness (36, 37); meaning that the doctor should inform the patient about the 
rationale behind rationing decisions and enhance the patient’s awareness that she shares 
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resources with other patients (40). Still others argue against explicit rationing and for implicit 
rationing (41, 171). Also extended use of evidence based medicine (EBM), guidelines (38, 
158, 172), monitoring (173), and economic incentives (38, 174) have been suggested as 
means to encourage GPs to ration. 
 
To conclude, a novel topic emerging in the field of medical ethics is the effect of shared 
decision-making on fairness and efficiency of resource allocation. There is still very little 
knowledge about how rationing decisions are negotiated between doctor and patient in 
consultations at the micro-level.  There is also a need to bring other healthcare models than 
the managed care model of the USA into this discussion. Further, it is necessary to see GP 
rationing decisions in a wider framework, i.e., how is the decision-making process related to 
the input of the macro-level principles of priority setting and patients’ rights and the output of 
the consultation’s affecting large scale patterns of resource use.   
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Aims 
 
Overall aim 
The overall aim of this thesis is to explore empirically how GPs experience the dilemmas of 
the gatekeeper role and how attitudes to shared decision-making relate to cost and quality of 
services.   
 
Aims of the individual papers 
Study 1. Focus group study of GPs’ experience of the gatekeeper role:  
 
Paper I: Introduction of the Patient-list System in General Practice: Changes in Norwegian 
Physicians’ Perception of their Gatekeeper Role.   
Aim: To explore whether and how the patient-list system influences GPs’ perception of the 
gatekeeper role. 
 
Paper II: “Saying no is no easy matter”. A qualitative study of competing concerns in 
rationing decisions in general practice. 
Aim: To explore GPs’ experience of dilemmas affecting rationing decisions. 
 
Study 2. Questionnaire study measuring outcome of attitudes to shared decision-making:  
 
Paper III: Patient involvement in clinical decision-making: The effect of GP attitude on 
patient satisfaction.  
Aim: To investigate attitudes towards shared decision-making in GPs and their patients and 
how these attitudes affect patient satisfaction. 
 
Paper IV: Congruence in attitudes between doctors and patients results in lower referral 
rates. A questionnaire survey among Norwegian general practitioners and their patients. 
Aim: To analyse whether congruence in attitudes between GP and patients towards shared 
decision-making affects the GP’s referral rate. 
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Methods 
Study 1. Focus group study 
To explore how rationing dilemmas are experienced in everyday practice, we conducted focus 
group interviews with Norwegian GPs from January to June 2002.   
 
A sample of 11 groups involving 81 participants was recruited from tutorial groups and 
specialists’ continuing education groups in the counties of Hordaland and Oslo. The 
participants were recruited to represent differences across age and gender as well as typical 
practices.  
 
The data were collected through the focus group interviews and a short questionnaire handed 
out to all participants at the interviews. The questionnaire contained background questions 
about age, gender, work experience, maximum limit on list size, current list size, satisfaction 
with list size, specialist education and whether the subjects practised in a rural or urban 
community. The focus interview guide (Appendix 1) was adjusted once, after the first group 
interview. The interviews were conducted by Carlsen, who is a social scientist trained in 
social anthropology, and Norheim, who at the time was working as a GP and Professor of 
Medical Ethics.  
 
The transcripts were coded by Carlsen according to a system of key-words developed jointly 
by the two researchers. Finally, the interviews were read through again, subject by subject, 
according to the main categories of codes. To present the findings, we extracted some quotes 
found to be representative for the results. We made some changes to convert the oral style of 
the original transcripts to a fluent written style and translated the statements from Norwegian 
to English.  
 
Some interview data were quantified: We counted the number of lines in the text 
corresponding to each participant including the researchers and used this to create an index of 
how much each participant spoke as a proportion of speech in the interview. We also counted 
the number of positive and negative statements about the patient-list system and compared 
this with the participants’ statements when they were explicitly asked to sum up their attitude 
to the new system. The quantified data was combined with the data from the questionnaires to 
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supplement and validate the qualitative data. We used Stata software to describe and analyse 
the quantitative data. 
 
Further details of the study design and sample is provided in paper I and II. 
 
Study 2. Questionnaire study 
As a follow up to the first study, we conducted a questionnaire study among GPs and their 
patients with the purpose of measuring GPs’ attitudes towards shared decision-making, and 
compare them to the attitudes of their patients. We also wanted to test the association of the 
different attitudes with patient satisfaction and rationing decisions (referrals). 
 
The study draws on survey data from two sources: one questionnaire completed by GPs and a 
second by their patients. In the summer of 2004, we sent a letter of invitation to the GPs in 
Bergen and asked them to distribute a patient questionnaire consecutively to 50 consulting 
patients, as well as to complete a questionnaire of their own. A reminder was sent to the GPs 
after three weeks. GPs and patients were linked by corresponding numbers, but no record was 
kept of the corresponding GP names, which meant that it was impossible to track the GPs who 
distributed the patient questionnaire but forgot to return their own. A total of 181 GPs were 
contacted and 56 of these distributed the survey among their patients. However 15 of the GPs 
did not return their own questionnaire. Thus for the purpose of combining GPs’ answers with 
patients’ answers we were left with 41 GPs. A total of 1268 patients belonging to 56 GPs 
responded. This corresponds to a mean response rate of 45% per GP.   
 
We calculated a sharing score based on an earlier validated measure, the Patient-Practitioner 
Orientation Scale (PPOS) for measuring preferences for shared decision-making (142) 
(Appendix 2). This is a Likert-scale questionnaire developed in a US study, where patients 
and doctors are asked to assess identical statements on the role of the doctor and patient in the 
consultation, where the highest score (=6) reflects preference for shared decision-making.  
 
In addition to the PPOS-scale, the questionnaires included background questions on age, 
gender, educational level (patients) and years of professional experience (GPs). The GPs 
reported the number of referrals and the number of consultations during the previous five 
working days together with some details about the practice, such as number of patients on the 
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list and satisfaction with list size. Patients were asked whether they had chosen this doctor as 
their regular GP and were asked to rate their overall satisfaction with the doctor on a six-point 
scale from not satisfied to very satisfied. 
 
We used the software Stata 8.0 to analyse the data. In addition to presenting descriptive 
statistics, we used linear and logistic regression analysis to investigate predictors of patient 
satisfaction and doctors’ referral rates. We also conducted multilevel analysis to adjust for 
clustering effects.  
 
The sharing score was generated as a mean of the scores of eight of the nine PPOS items. 
Statement no. 6 was excluded because a disturbing number of respondents (181 = 14%) had 
chosen not to assess this statement.  
 
We made a file where each patient’s scores were combined with the scores of the 
corresponding doctor. In this way we could study each doctor–patient pair and use patient 
scores (patient satisfaction) as the dependent variable. Then we merged the scores of all the 
patients connected with the same doctor and allotted the median scores of these patients to the 
doctors’ scores. Since the PPOS instrument was identical for doctors and patients, it was 
possible to construct a difference score as a measure of the fit in attitudes between doctor and 
patients. This score was tested as a predictor of patient satisfaction in a logistic regression 
model. The difference score was also one of the predictors tested in a linear regression model 
explaining referral rates.  
 
Additional details of the study design and sample are provided in papers III and IV. 
 
Ethical considerations 
The project was reviewed and approved by the Norwegian Social Science Data Service 
against the privacy and licence requirements of the Personal Data Registers Act and the 
guidelines for research ethics in the social sciences, law and the humanities according to the 
National Committee for Research Ethics in the Social Sciences and the Humanities. All 
respondents were informed about anonymity issues and the purpose of the study.  
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Results 
 
Paper I 
Introduction of the patient-list system in general practice: Changes in Norwegian 
physicians’ perception of their gatekeeper role. 
 
The introduction of the patient-list system implied a change in the organisation of patient 
relations, favouring continuity and closer links between doctor and patient. The reform also 
introduced a change in the remuneration system by increasing the activity-based component 
of GPs income and introducing a capitation component. Accordingly, we expected changes in 
the influence of patients and of private economic motives on GPs’ decision-making in relation 
to their gatekeeper role. The study explores whether and how the patient-list system 
influences GPs’ perception of the gatekeeper role. 
 
 
Most of the informants had experienced a change in how they perceived the gatekeeper role 
and how they performed the role of gatekeeper. The most and least experienced GPs seemed 
to experience least change, while GPs in areas with a surplus of GPs (Oslo) were more 
affected by the reform. The main finding was that most GPs perceived themselves as less 
eager to perform the gatekeeper function in the new scheme, and it appears that GPs act as 
gatekeepers only when they are able to convince the patient of their opinion. The informants’ 
accounts of the background to this change fell within three main categories; accentuated 
competition, increased expectations from patients and more responsibility and continuity of 
care towards patients. The combination of these factors seems to encourage more attention to 
patients’ demands and less deliberate rationing. The reform gives the patient more negotiating 
power but at the same time the GP is ascribed an increased gatekeeper function. According to 
our findings, it seems that the success of the first aim undermines the second.  
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Paper II 
“Saying no is no easy matter”. A qualitative study of competing concerns in rationing 
decisions in general practice. 
 
In this paper, we analysed the data of the focus group interviews on a general level, 
examining the GPs’ attitudes to different factors of influence, not only to those connected to 
the list reform. We focused particularly on rationing dilemmas and how this affects decision-
making.  
 
Four major concerns appeared in the group discussions: The obligation to ration health care, 
professional autonomy, patient autonomy, and competition. A central finding indicate that 
GPs find rationing difficult because saying “no” in face to face meetings is often experienced 
as uncomfortable and in conflict with other important concerns. The obligation to ration 
health care did not seem to be generally embraced by GPs. Professional norms and respect for 
patient autonomy on the other hand, were strongly emphasised as at the very core of their 
professional judgement. When it came to the role of economic incentives, statements were 
more ambiguous. The idea of economic incentives was sometimes dismissed as an external 
factor without power to influence GP decision-making, while other informants expressed 
concern that market mechanisms are gradually undermining professional autonomy. However, 
the economic incentives of the current system were not felt to be supporting the gatekeeper 
role. 
 
Professional autonomy in relation to patients was experienced as a necessary requirement for 
fulfilling the rationing role, and rationing was often seen to be in conflict with respect for 
patient autonomy. On the other hand, respect for patient autonomy was easily combined with 
increased competition between GPs and the current economic incentives. In summary, there 
seemed to be a central tension between rationing health care and maintaining professional 
autonomy on the one hand and patient autonomy and concerns about competition for patients 
on the other.   
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Paper III 
Patient involvement in clinical decision-making: The effect of GP attitude on patient 
satisfaction.  
 
Through descriptive statistics and analyses of survey data this paper describes Norwegian 
GPs’ and patients’ attitudes to shared decision-making, as well as how GPs’ attitudes and 
congruence in attitudes between GPs and patients, affect patient satisfaction. 
 
On the basis of matched questionnaires of 41 GPs and 829 consulting patients, we found that 
Norwegian patients have a strong preference for shared decision-making. GPs scored lower 
than patients, which is the opposite of the findings of a similar study carried out in the USA. 
This may support the findings in Study 1, which indicate that patients have become more 
demanding and powerful. We also find that patient age and female gender have positive 
effects on satisfaction, which is consistent with earlier studies 
 
There was a strong positive effect of the GPs’ score for shared decision-making on patient 
satisfaction, but no significant effect of congruence of attitudes between patient and GP on 
patient satisfaction. The suggested interpretation of this finding is that GPs who welcome 
patient involvement are more responsive to patients’ needs and therefore satisfy patients even 
when patients’ attitude differs from the GPs’ attitude. Therefore, it makes sense to continue 
promoting the participatory consultation style even though some patients do prefer a passive 
role. 
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Paper IV 
Congruence in attitudes between doctors and patients results in lower referral rates. A 
questionnaire survey among Norwegian general practitioners and their patients. 
 
In this paper we used the survey data to test whether congruence in attitudes between GPs and 
patients towards shared decision-making influences referral decisions. 
 
Analysing the combination of data from 41 GPs and 835 of their patients we found that the 
score measuring difference in attitudes had a strong positive effect on referral rate. This 
means that the smaller the difference in attitudes towards shared decision-making between GP 
and patients, the lower the referral rate.   
 
Of the control variables, only GP gender had a significant effect on referral rate, indicating 
that male GPs refer more than female GPs. Male GPs had around 28% higher referral rates 
than female GPs. 
 
Furthermore, we correlated the referral rate with the GP and patient scores for shared 
decision-making respectively to check how attitudes were associated with referral rate. We 
found a strong negative correlation between the GP score and referral rate, meaning that GPs 
who prefer shared decision-making are less likely to refer, a result also confirmed in other 
studies.  
 
The results indicate that interaction of attitudes towards shared decision making between GP 
and patients influences medical decisions; similar attitudes enhance the chance of solving the 
medical problem within the GP’s practice. Disregarding the issue of the quality of decisions, 
the study indicates that a close doctor–patient match may contribute to cost containment and 
secure that patients are treated at the lowest appropriate level of care, which is a central aim 
within Norwegian health policy. The patients’ right to choose their GP could enhance the 
doctor-patient match and thereby indirectly limit unnecessary use of specialist care. 
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Overall results 
Norwegian GPs feel that they have become more attentive to patients’ preferences, but still 
not as much as patients would like. The results also indicate that the transfer of power from 
GP to patient makes it more difficult to manage resource allocation. Attitudes towards patient 
involvement affect both quality and quantity of services. 
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Discussion 
Methodological considerations 
Only methodological considerations not thoroughly considered in the papers are discussed in 
this section. 
Study 1. Focus group study  
According to Barth (120), in order to understand the aggregate pattern of actions, we need to 
discover the underlying values and subjective views of the actors. In other words, to 
understand the pattern of resource use in the health sector, a useful starting point is to explore 
the attitudes of the health workers. In a focus group interview, the interviewees are among 
peers and it appears that through the discussions between them, core values and norms are 
acknowledged and articulated (175). Therefore, focus interviews are a recommended tool for 
investigating attitudes and the norms and considerations that lie behind them (175). This was 
our main reason for using the focus group method in our study of the GPs’ gatekeeper role in 
a changing primary care system. An additional reason was the lack of pre-reform data, which 
inhibits a classical evaluation design with before and after comparisons. Qualitative 
interviews enable participants to consider the present situation in the light of their common 
memory of their situation before the reform. Qualitative focus interviews are suitable for 
exploring the past, the present and even thoughts about the future in quite a different manner 
from quantitative cross sectional data (176). 
 
The downside of focus groups is that they are less suitable for revealing attitudes that deviate 
from group norms. Neither do they convey much information about the distribution of 
different opinions or how common the dominating attitudes are. In paper II we argue that this 
is not a critical issue in this study because we were mainly aiming to reveal the common view 
among Norwegian GPs at the time and not the whole picture of attitudes. Nevertheless, we 
checked the proportion of speech by each participant and matched it with their opinions about 
the reform. The conclusion was that the participants with the most negative or most positive 
opinions spoke the most. This might be due to a relatively stronger urge to state their 
opinions, but the results might also be influenced by the researchers’ expectations that there 
would be a change in attitudes connected to the reform, which was reflected in the questions 
we posed. Naturally, when change and reform is the focus of a study, the participants try to 
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come up with good examples of changing features. Altogether this implies that we might have 
overstated the effects of the reform. In hindsight, we should perhaps have given more 
attention to the participants who claimed that they experienced little or no change with the 
reform.     
 
Another potentially problematic issue concerning reflexivity was our theoretical basis in the 
idea of rational choice. We deliberately tried to increase the participants’ consciousness about 
their clinical choices and to distinguish the important factors of influence. For some of the 
participants, this appeared to be the first time they thought about the reasons, other than the 
clinical, why they usually made discretionary choices. Still, it might be argued that even 
decisions that are not made explicitly after considered deliberation, choices that are more 
habitual or conform to expectations, may ultimately rest on rational reasons. Bourdieu argues 
that social agents may be strategic without conscious calculation; they might be “absorbed in 
their affairs” or “have the game under their skin” and therefore not be thinking intellectually 
about the ends of the game (46). Looking at is this way, it is possible that these ends were 
discerned during the group discussions so that both the researchers and the participants 
became aware of them. However, it is possible that our initial focus affected the selection of 
influencing factors that were discussed. On the positive side, this makes the finding that the 
gatekeeper role was not one of the important concerns, even more conspicuous. 
 
Study 1 started out on assignment from the health authorities through the Research Council of 
Norway as part of a national evaluation of the patient-list system in primary care. When 
conducting applied policy research, there are some special conditions that affect how data are 
gathered and analysed, which are taken into consideration in the Framework approach (177). 
This methodology in fact shares some of the characteristics of quantitative approaches. One 
such condition is the request for finding answers to specific questions, which, in Study 1 led 
to the decision to keep the original interview guide intact (after altering it once after the first, 
pilot interview). Also Richard Krueger, one of the founding fathers of the focus group 
methodology, recommends consistency in interview questions across groups, but with the 
exception of questions that do not seem to work well in the first groups (178). This stands in 
contrast to much qualitative research which is based on the phenomenological approach of 
grounded theory. Glaser and Strauss advocated the technique of theoretical sampling and 
constant comparison, which in this study would require that the questions be constantly 
altered according to the findings of the latest interview with the aim of illuminating uncovered 
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aspects of the topic of interest (179, 180). Ideally this process continues until nothing new is 
revealed and the study has reached its point of theoretical saturation.  A restricting 
consequence of asking the same questions in all the groups is, of course, that we are imposing 
more of our preconceptions into the data than normally accepted in qualitative studies. We 
thereby risk missing concerns of importance to the informants but that they were not 
encouraged to talk about.  
 
On the other hand, in one of the early interviews with a group of only female GPs, the 
interviewees reacted quite negatively to some of the questions, claiming that they were 
provocative and expressing a disinterest in the main focus of the study. At the time we 
considered altering the interview guide. However, in later interviews, the same questions 
received positive response and induced lively discussion among the participants. Had we 
decided to alter the questions, interesting data would have been missed from the later groups. 
Another positive consequence was a discovery that part of the reason behind the negative 
response to the questions was that they touched upon topics which the GPs were reluctant to 
discuss openly, e.g. the loss of professional autonomy because of consumerism. With respect 
to this, we were then able to compare the different groups and informants and use the 
reactions to the questions as valuable information. For example, we noted systematic 
differences in the openness in the discussions according to which of the researchers were 
present; whether it was the social scientist, the medical professor or both. Participants seemed 
more willing to discuss influence of other concerns than clinical considerations, when 
Norheim (who is also a MD) was present, and even more so in the one interview where 
Carlsen (the social scientists) was absent. 
 
Regarding the selection of informants, we used purposive sampling according to knowledge 
about influencing factors such as gender, work experience and specialist education. We 
decided the number of focus groups in advance, and were therefore prevented from 
continuing until a point of saturation as is a common recommendation in the literature on 
qualitative methodology (180). Looking back, it would probably have been sufficient with 
about half the number of groups.  
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Study 2. Questionnaire study  
Here, we chose a quantitative approach because the aim was to get an overview of the 
distribution of attitudes towards patient influence discussed in the focus group study. Also the 
quantitative approach could yield information about the relative degree of influence of these 
attitudes, measured here as influence on patient satisfaction and on referral decisions (as 
proxies of quality and resource allocation). Questionnaire survey was a natural choice of 
methodology as it enabled us to pose the questions most suited to our aim. Administrative 
register data was not an alternative source in this study as data about attitudes towards the 
patient’s role in medical decision-making are not collected on a regular basis, and there is no 
Norwegian register connecting data about the individual GP to the corresponding patient data 
on an individual level.  
 
As discussed in papers III and IV, we decided to distribute the patient questionnaires through 
their GPs, partly to secure an adequate patient response rate. This had consequences for the 
selections and response rate of the patients, but also for the proportion and number of GPs 
willing to take part in the study. The limitations created by the sampling procedure have been 
thoroughly discussed in the two papers. In summary, the patient response rate was adequate, 
but would probably have been higher if some of the GPs had not withdrawn shortly after 
initiating the survey among their patients. We also lack information about the non-
respondents. The selection of GPs was perhaps even more problematic as only 56 of 181 GPs 
in Bergen agreed to participate, although we had some information about the non-respondents 
of this population. However, it might be argued that it is irrelevant to assess the response rate 
of the participating GPs in normal terms, as they were asked to carry out the data collection, 
which probably requires a much higher degree of commitment and trust in the research 
project than had they only been asked to fill in a postal questionnaire themselves.  
It is not obvious what could have been done to overcome these difficulties, but in hindsight, 
we should have applied for permission to keep records of names and numbers of GPs during 
the data collection period and perhaps should have recruited by telephone. 
 
We used an already validated scale, the Patient Practitioner Orientation Scale (PPOS), to 
measure attitudes to shared decision-making because of the advantages of consistency in 
measurement instruments for comparison of results. However, the scale has some limitations 
that are not discussed in the papers. According to Krupat and colleagues who developed the 
scale, the sharing score measures – “the extent to which the respondents believe that patients 
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desire information and should be part of the decision making process” (142). Among the nine 
items of the scale, there are several items related to the sharing of information and to patient 
autonomy in interpreting the information, there are also items referring to respect for patients 
and the division of power between doctor and patient but there are no items directly related to 
decision-making. It is therefore somewhat unclear what the scale measures; whether the 
results actually measure attitudes related to decision-making or perhaps more general attitudes 
to patient involvement in the consultation. We know that preferences for sharing information 
are not necessarily correlated to preferences for sharing decisions (123). On the positive side 
it could be argued that the scale reflects the complexity of the phenomenon we were focusing 
on.  
 
The shortcomings of the satisfaction measure are discussed in paper III. In addition to the 
points raised in this paper, it should be noted that although patient satisfaction is the most 
widely used measure of quality of general practice, it is far from being a comprehensive 
measure of quality and outcome (181). Alternatively, quality of referral decisions may be 
measured in hospital admission rates or by GP’s review of degree of unnecessary referrals. 
 
Informant accuracy 
A well-known quandary in both focus interviews and surveys is the problem of informant 
accuracy (182). It is not unusual that there is a discrepancy between people’s attitudes or 
intentions and actual behaviour, either because of a lack of overview over one’s own actions, 
inconsistencies in opinions or a lack of honesty (129, 183). This incongruity and its 
consequences for social analysis are a problem that has received attention in several social 
sciences. It is part of the reasoning behind the anthropological methodology of participant 
observation (182) and an important subject of economic analyses of stated versus revealed 
preferences (184). In surveys using questionnaires such as the PPOS or other patient-
preference studies, it is also often difficult to know when the respondents are describing an 
ideal world and when they are instead implicitly correcting for what they feel is realistic to 
expect (176). Hence an observational study would have added to the findings. Still, because of 
ethical and practical restrictions, we did not consider observations of consultations as an 
option for this study.  
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In paper III, we find that preference for shared decision-making in GPs promotes patient 
satisfaction, while congruence in attitudes does not have the same effect. Our suggested 
explanation is that GPs, who claim they have an ideal of sharing decision-making, do not 
always act accordingly: They probably adapt their behaviour to the patient’s preferences. This 
however, does not necessarily mean that they are dishonest when answering the survey. A UK 
study using focus group interviews with GPs also finds that the ideal of patient involvement 
in rationing decisions is adhered to at a theoretical level, but proves to be problematic in 
practice because the ideal of patient involvement collides with other important concerns (29). 
Still, an observational study would be an interesting follow up to explore the suggestion that 
GPs who prefer patient involvement have a more flexible consultation style. This is also what 
we see when we compare our finding in the survey with the data from the focus interviews: In 
the survey, almost all the GPs say they were more or less in favour of shared decision-
making, but the qualitative study revealed that this is a dilemma in practical work. Thus it 
may be argued that the small variation in GP attitudes found in the survey probably is a pale 
reflection of the variation in consultation style. This is a reminder of what a complicated task 
it is to analyse clinical choices in general practice, complicated because they are made in the 
meeting between GP and patient with its dynamics of power distribution and negotiations, and 
because the two actors have separate aims and priorities.  
 
 44
Discussion of results 
Study 1. GPs’ experience of the gatekeeper role.  
 
In Study 1 the central finding was that the GPs seem to be turning away from the gatekeeper 
role and its unpleasant rationing decisions. One important reason for this, according to the 
interviewees, was that patients have become increasingly demanding and have gained more 
negotiating power. Our interpretation is that the patients probably are gradually influencing 
the GPs’ decisions more. Study 1 also indicated that the GPs are concerned about losing 
professional autonomy as a consequence of increased patient autonomy and increasing control 
by health authorities.  
 
It is difficult for the GP to decide when the patient’s view should be overriding and when the 
GP should have the final word. The doctor is supposed to act in the best interests of the 
patient but what is meant by the best interests of the patient? The question of what is 
beneficial from the patient’s perspective has only recently been posed in modern medicine 
(151, 185) and the conceptualisation of it is seldom discussed in theory (26). Yet in practice it 
is a daily dilemma that was much discussed in the focus groups (Study 1). Central ideals for 
the GPs, such as respect for patient autonomy and shared decision-making, imply that 
decisions are made together with patients and that the patient’s subjective view will be part of 
the basis for decisions. For example will referrals or controls that are unnecessary according 
to the biomedical model, be justifiable when patients’ worries are considered in the medical 
decisions. In practice the GPs seemed to avoid the problematic issues of rationing by 
including patients’ desires in the definition of beneficial care whenever there was a conflict 
with an insistent patient. We interpreted this attitude as ‘avoidance of rationing’. This 
supports a recent qualitative study among Australian GPs, where the authors also warn that 
GPs may hide behind respect for patient autonomy in medical decision-making while driven 
by less admirable motives (138). This finding is also partly consistent with Jones et al’s study 
from the UK, which notes a gap between ideals and practice in rationing decisions due to 
conflicting concerns (29). The UK GPs, however, seemed to solve the dilemma by sacrificing 
explicit rationing, while they still rationed health care implicitly.   
 
In an affluent health care system such as the Norwegian one, rationing is mainly about 
marginal health problems and marginal benefits, and our study indicates that most GPs are not 
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motivated to ration under these conditions, even though they recognise the necessity of 
rationing under other circumstances, e.g. if there was a budget responsibility tied to the 
gatekeeper role. This leads us to suggested solutions forwarded by the theoretical literature in 
medical ethics concerned with the advocate versus gatekeeper dilemma of the GP role. Some 
of these studies aim to offer gatekeepers a key for managing rationing, such as, accountability 
for reasonableness, EBM and practice guidelines. It is recognised that saying no to patients’ 
wishes is time consuming and risks displeasing and thereby losing patients (160). The effort 
is, of course, praiseworthy as transparency in medical decision-making is arguably a moral 
prerequisite for a balanced doctor-patient relationship. However, it is not self evident that GPs 
who have no budget responsibilities, will ration merely because they are taught how to 
overcome these obstacles. Still it is time consuming, and the risk of displeasing patients is not 
eliminated, so why should GPs bother to ration? Our study also indicated that in the 
Norwegian context, increased professional responsibility and competition discourages GPs 
from rationing. In conclusion, our study suggests that to Norwegian GPs the question is not so 
much how to overcome the obstacles of rationing so much as a lack of motivation for 
rationing.  
 
Most of the dilemmas we note in Study 1 are neither new to the literature nor unexpected; 
both the advocate-gatekeeper dilemma, the tension of balancing care and cost, the dilemma 
between ideals of patient involvement and fair and efficient resource allocation, conflicts 
between professional and patient autonomy and conflicts between private financial gains and 
rationing have been described earlier. However, our study suggests that the most imperative 
predicament among these was tension experienced between the obligation to ration and 
respect for patient autonomy. This dilemma has only recently been pointed out on a 
theoretical level and has hardly been explored empirically. I also believe Study 1 adds to the 
literature on the GP’s gatekeeper role in that the different concerns and dilemmas are explored 
as parts of a complex structure of relationships surrounding the GPs. Thus we make some first 
steps toward understanding how the different dilemmas reinforce or neutralise each other.   
 
Study 2. Outcome of attitudes to shared decision-making  
The findings in Study 1 showed that the GPs were experiencing a transfer of power from 
themselves to the patients. Modern patients were described as increasingly demanding and 
competent, and the doctors’ ideal of involving patients in the decision-making process, was 
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felt as pressure to give up professional autonomy in favour of patient autonomy. However, 
this finding left us with the question of whether the GPs’ view reflected an actual demand for 
influence by the patients. In Study 2 we aimed answering this question by mapping and 
measuring such attitudes and discovering the distribution of attitudes between GPs and 
patients. Another part of the motivation behind Study 2 was to test whether GP and patient 
attitudes towards the sharing of decisions influence medical decision-making.  
 
Study 2 adds to the impression given by the participating GPs in Study 1 that patients would 
like more influence than the GPs would like to give up. Our findings could shed some light on 
a debate in the literature about shared decision-making, where the consensus of the majority 
of studies is that shared decision making is the prevailing consultation style and that many 
modern patients are competent and demanding (16, 126, 129, 131, 142, 186). Opposed to this 
are a handful of critical studies suggesting that that modern patients are not as influential as 
we would have expected and that shared decision-making is not a realistic description of most 
consultations (132). Even groups with chronic ailments do not necessarily experience 
increased power and autonomy in relation to doctors (134). Particularly, one of the evaluation 
studies conducted in connection with the Norwegian list reform suggests that chronic illness 
sufferers and frequent attenders do not feel that the reform has in any way enhanced their 
power with the GPs. They even experience that the reform has made the GPs stricter 
regarding patients’ demand for referrals to specialist care (187). On basis of our findings in 
both studies I believe the academic dispute about the current level of patient involvement, 
may be an artefact, related to whether the studies are based on doctors or patients’ experience 
or researchers interpretations of observational data. Together Study 1 and Study 2 indicate 
that the diverging views between GPs and patients might be interpreted as a testimony of the 
struggle for power that the GPs in Study 1 describe. The studies show that both doctors and 
patients’ autonomy is central, and negotiated, and they somehow are in conflict. It is 
interesting to compare our finding to an observational study by Winefield et al, which 
suggests that GPs are less satisfied after a participatory consultation, which tends to last 
longer and include diffuse ailments. Also Haug & Lavin have a perspective of conflict on the 
GP-patient interaction and point to the struggle for control that takes place in consultation 
(188). They find that rather independent of ideals about consultation style, most GPs struggle 
to stay in charge in the consultation, preferably through persuasion. On the other hand, their 
findings are based on self-reported survey data, which of course leaves us with the uncertainty 
of whether they correctly report behaviour. The diverging interpretations of negotiations 
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between GP and patient have also been discussed in a fairly recent BMJ editorial where Nicky 
Britten suggests, “Patient pressure may be stronger in the doctor’s mind than in the patient’s,” 
which underlines the noted discrepancy between the GP’s perception of pressure and the 
patient’s expectations (189). 
 
In Paper IV, the findings show that if the GP is positive to shared decision-making, it is less 
likely that the consultation will result in a referral. It seems like this result does not support 
the findings in Study 1 that patients are demanding referrals, and that respect for patient 
autonomy induces the GP to give in to the patients’ demands. This apparent disagreement is 
also reflected in the literature, as studies of shared decision-making find that patient 
involvement seems to lower referral rates (140, 190, 191) while studies of variation in referral 
rates show that perceived patient pressure and the liability to give in to patients’ wishes 
induces the GP to refer (85, 111). Based on our two studies, several reasons for the 
discrepancy could be suggested: Firstly, it is possible that the impression from the focus group 
study (Study 1) is coloured by the researchers’ explicit focus on the gatekeeper role, causing a 
disproportional number of examples of demanding patients. Secondly, the PPOS-scale used in 
paper IV, is designed to measure preference for shared decision-making, while in Study 1 the 
informants are perhaps referring to consumerism; especially determined patients dominating 
decision-making. Another explanation could be that the informants in Study 1 refer to a 
package of reasons that makes them refer more, while Study 2 concentrate solely on the 
attitudes towards shared decision-making. Finally, a medical decision in general practice is a 
product of the choices and influence of at least two different actors; the GP and the patient, 
and it is not certain that when the patients are taking a greater role in the decisions, this results 
in more referrals. There are indications that patient involvement lower intervention rates (190-
192). We merely observe that both parties affect decisions. 
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Conclusions and implications 
The GPs participating in this study left us with the impression that they are passive as 
gatekeepers in the interaction with what they experience as increasingly powerful patients. 
The GPs seem to be aiming to avoid conflict with patients because they have a lack of 
motivation and a scarcity of instruments for rationing. Based on the present study and what 
we know from earlier studies, I would argue that patients probably affect medical decision-
making increasingly at the cost of the GP’s gatekeeper role. This seems to make patients 
satisfied with their GP, but it is uncertain whether the development supports a fair and rational 
allocation of resources, partly because some groups are more resourceful and capable of 
getting adequate health services (193). The finding in paper IV that shared decision-making 
and congruence in attitudes decreases referral rates, is interesting primarily in connection to 
crude cost containment, but it points to the need for more studies of different activities and of 
the quality of decisions, which could reveal direct effects of how the GP-patient interaction 
influence distribution of services. 
 
This thesis adds to a small but growing literature concerning the legitimate limits of GPs’ 
responsibility and of patient demands (132, 138). Shared decision-making in general practice 
is an important ideal because it puts the patient’s needs in focus, but the effect on resource 
allocation is less clear and should be investigated. Open debate about how the GP-patient 
interaction affects resource allocation in health care should be encouraged. There is also a 
need to discuss the role and limitation of patient involvement in medical decision-making.  
 
The study illuminates the doctor–patient dyad as a central arena for implementation of priority 
setting in the health care sector and touches upon various insufficiently explored topics: 
 
Suggestions for further research 
• In studies of resource allocation and GP rationing, patients’ influence should be 
incorporated.  
 
• Future research about the implementation of priority setting should concentrate on 
how to motivate and convince GPs of the importance of high quality rationing and 
filtering.    
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• Future studies of shared decision-making should also focus on quality of decisions and 
health outcome, combining measures of patient satisfaction with other quality 
indicators.  
 
• There is a need for studies exploring how attitudes of patients and GPs are connected 
to behaviour. Observational or experimental studies are of interest but pose particular 
methodological and ethical challenges.  
 
• Comparative and empirical studies of GPs’ rationing dilemmas are needed. 
 
Implications for practice 
• There are several reasons to promote further shared decision-making in general 
practice, but its content should be discussed. Particularly questions about the limitation 
of patients’ rights and how to secure a well-functioning gatekeeper role are important.   
 
• Medical education should promote awareness of both respect for patient autonomy and 
the need for rationing in medical practice. It is vital to make it clear that these 
principles are often experienced as conflicting in practice. 
 
• To reinforce the GPs’ gatekeeper function and thereby reduce inefficient resource 
allocation, evidence-based practice and more extensive guidelines combined with 
better monitoring could be implemented.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Study 1: Interview guide.  
 
 
1. Around the table: First names and a short description of your practices. 
   
2. Do you think the terms ”advocate” and ”gatekeeper” describe central aspects of your 
role in relation to your patients? 
 
3. Does the fact that you now are responsible for a patient list influence the relationship 
between yourself and the patients? 
 
4. Does the responsibility for the list patients affect the way you make discretionary 
choices? 
 
5. What does the new payment system mean to you? 
 
6. Does the payment system influence the way you make discretionary choices?  
 
7. Has the service offered at your office changed with the Regular General Practitioner 
Scheme?  
 
8. Can you give some examples of difficult decisions concerning standard prescriptions?  
 
9. Can you give some examples of difficult decisions concerning referrals?  
 
10. Can you give some examples of difficult decisions concerning sickness certificates?  
 
11.  What are the disadvantages of the Regular General Practitioner Scheme? 
 
12.   What are the advantages of the Regular General Practitioner Scheme? 
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Appendix 2. Study 2: Sharing score.  
 
Patient–provider orientation scale items (PPOS) (Krupat et al., 2000) 
(1) The patient is the one who should decide what gets talked about during a visit.  
(2) It is often best for patients if they do not have a full explanation of their medical condition.  
(3) Patients should not only rely on their doctor’s knowledge but try to find out about their 
conditions on their own.  
(4) Many patients continue asking questions until they understand the information given by 
the doctor.  
(5) Patients should be treated as if they were partners with the doctor, equal in power and 
status.  
(6) When patients disagree with their doctor, this is a sign that the doctor does not have the 
patient’s respect and trust.  
(7) Most patients appreciate to take their time in the doctor’s office.  
(8) The patient must always be aware that the doctor is in charge.  
(9) When patients look up medical information on their own, this usually confuses more than 
it helps.  
 
